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Updates from the International Criminal Courts
International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
Cases and Proceedings
On September 27, 2007, the Trial
Chamber handed down its decision in
the so-called Vukovar Three case. Mile
Mrkšić, Veselin Šljivančanin, and Miroslav
Radić were indicted for involvement in the
abduction of roughly 260 non-Serbs from
the Vukovar Hospital, and the eventual
murder and deposit of these individuals into mass graves in Ovčara. Mrkšić,
the commander of all Serb forces in the
Vukovar area, was sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment for war crimes, including
aiding and abetting the murder, torture,
and cruel treatment of 194 non-Serb prisoners of war. Šljivančanin, head of the
security organ of the Guard’s Motorised
Brigade and Operation Group South, was
sentenced to five years imprisonment for
the war crime of aiding and abetting torture
of prisoners of war. Radić, the company
commander of the First Battalion and
Guards Motorised Brigade, was acquitted
of charges of crimes against humanity and
war crimes.
Mrkšić was found guilty because he
allowed prisoners to be taken from the
hospital to Ovčara and then withdrew the
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) troops
guarding these prisoners with the knowledge that the local Territorial Defence and
paramilitary forces intended to harm them.
Šljivančanin was found guilty because he
failed to secure adequate guards in Ovčara
or to ensure that the JNA guards acted to
prevent the beating of the prisoners.
After finding that the victims were
targeted specifically for their known or
believed involvement with the Croatian
forces, the Trial Chamber dismissed all
charges of crimes against humanity. The
Chamber also found no evidence that the
three men participated in a joint criminal enterprise for committing the offenses
against the prisoners in Vukovar. Following
the judgment, the mood in Croatia was one
of disappointment over perceived leniency
in the sentencing. Many Croatians consider

the massacre outside of Vukovar to be one
of the most brazen episodes of violence
during the war.
Also on September 27, 2007, the Appeals
Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s judgment in Limaj et al. This case charged three
former members of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) for their purported involvement in crimes against both Serb and
Kosovo Albanian civilians in the KLA-run
Llapushnik/Lapušnik prison camp between
May and July 1998. The charges against
Haradin Bala, a prison guard at the camp,
were confirmed, and he was sentenced to
13 years imprisonment for torture, cruel
treatment and murder. The acquittals of
Fatmir Limaj and Isak Musliu were also
upheld because the prosecutor was unable
to prove that the soldiers were participants
in a joint criminal enterprise furthering torture and cruel treatment of prisoners.
On July 20, 2007, in the interests of justice, the Tribunal’s Referral Bench revoked
a decision referring Sredoje Lukić to
Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial. It opted
instead to try him jointly with his cousin
Milan Lukić at the Tribunal in the Hague.
Because the two cases are factually similar,
the Referral Bench believed that holding
separate trials would be an ineffective use
of resources, and would also unnecessarily
exacerbate witness trauma. Milan Lukić
was the leader of the “White Eagles” or
“Avengers,” a Bosnian Serb paramilitary
group that exacted a reign of violence
over the town of Višegrad in southeastern
Bosnia. Sredoje Lukić was a member of
the group. Both are charged with the brutal
murders of over 100 Bosnian Muslim civilians in Višegrad.
The trial of Rasim Delić, former
commander of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, began on July 9, 2007. Delić
is one of the most senior members of
the Bosnian Army to come before the
Tribunal. He is being tried under a theory
of command responsibility for the murder, cruel treatment, and rapes of captured Croat and Serb soldiers and civilians.
Among other crimes, he is charged with
failing to take the necessary and reasonable
40

measures to punish his subordinates who
captured and executed Bosnian Croat civilians and soldiers in the villages of Maline
and Bikoši. He is also accused of failing
to take necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent torture, beatings, murder, and
decapitation of Bosnian Serb Army soldiers and the rape of three women by his
subordinates, the El Mujahed Detachment,
in the Kamenica Camp.
On June 12, 2007, Milan Martić was
convicted on 16 counts of persecution,
murder, torture, deportation, attacks on
civilians, wanton destruction of civilian
areas, and other crimes against humanity
and violations of the laws and customs of
war and sentenced to 35 years imprisonment. Martić was Minister of the Interior,
Minister of Defence, and President of
the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous
Region of Krajina (within Bosnia and
Herzegovina). He was found to have participated, alongside other high-level Tribunal
indictees — Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan
Milošević, Ratko Mladić and others — in
a joint criminal enterprise whose aim was
to ethnically cleanse areas of the former
Yugoslavia through widespread and systematic crimes.
Convictions of Bosnian Serb Army officers Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić
for their involvement in the Srebrenica
massacre were upheld by the Appeals
Chamber on May 9, 2007. While affirming
Blagojević’s conviction for crimes against
humanity, the Appeals Chamber reversed
charges of complicity in genocide against
him and reduced his sentence from 18 to 15
years. The Chamber confirmed judgment
against Jokić, Chief Engineer of the Zvornik
Brigade of the Bosnian Serb Army, for aiding and abetting exterminations, murder,
and persecution by deploying equipment
and personnel needed to carry out mass
burials in and around Srebrenica.
After being on the run for more than two
years, Assistant Commander of Intelligence
and Security for the Bosnian Serb Army
Zdravko Tolimir was apprehended in eastern Bosnia by Bosnian Serb authorities on
May 31, 2007, and later handed over to
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European Union forces. His capture was
not as fortuitous as it appeared, however. It
was widely reported that Serbian authorities
actually apprehended Tolimir in a Belgrade
apartment and handed him over to Bosnian
Serb authorities near the Republika Srpska
border in an effort to appease both Serb
ultra-nationalists and the European Union,
which demands that Serbia increase cooperation with the Tribunal as a condition for
membership consideration.
Tolimir is being charged as a part of a
joint criminal enterprise aimed at forcing
the Muslim population from the Srebrenica
and Žepa enclaves and into areas outside
the control of the Republika Srpska. His
indictment includes charges of genocide,
attributing him with responsibility for the
murder of more than 7,000 Muslim men
and boys killed in Srebrenica in 1995. He
is also charged with other crimes arising
from the Srebrenica massacre, including
killing Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the
towns of Potočari and Bratunac in eastern Bosnia and supervising the Bosnian
Serb Army as it summarily executed more
than 1,700 Muslim men and boys at the
Branjevo Military Farm and the Pilica
Cultural Center. Tolimir’s trial is now
underway. He suffers from severe medical problems, however, and has refused to
submit to medical treatment while in the
Tribunal’s custody.

Tribunal Completion Strategy
The mandate of the Tribunal’s prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, was extended by
Security Council resolution from September
15 to December 31, 2007, to ensure a
smooth transition to her successor. Many at
the United Nations speculate that her successor will be Belgian Serge Brammertz,
who currently leads the UN investigation
into the assassination of Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik al-Hariri. For continuity
purposes, the preferred successor among
senior prosecution staff is Del Ponte’s current deputy, American David Tolbert.
Under the terms of the Tribunal’s completion strategy, all trials should be completed by 2009 and all appeals by 2010.
The Tribunal has begun transferring a
small number of cases involving low and
intermediate-level accused to competent
courts in the former Yugoslavia, allowing the Tribunal to focus on those most
responsible for the most serious crimes

committed in the region. By allowing local
courts to adjudicate these cases, and the
concomitant exposure to issues of humanitarian law, it is hoped that these transfers
will strengthen the rule of law in the former
Yugoslavia.
On June 11 the Tribunal transferred
the case of Milorad Trbić, a former security officer of the Bosnian Serb army, to
the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Prosecutor
filed a Rule 11 bis motion for the referral
to a domestic court in Bosnia. After considering the gravity of the crimes and his
alleged level of responsibility, the Referral
Bench agreed to the transfer. Thus far, ten
individuals indicted by the Tribunal have
been transferred to Bosnia, one to Serbia,
and two to Croatia.
Of the 161 individuals indicted by the
Tribunal, only four remain fugitives. These
include high-level indictees Ratko Mladić
and Radovan Karadžić. Mladić, the military commander of the Bosnian Serb army,
and Karadžić, the president of the Bosnian
Serb administration, are largely considered
the masterminds behind many atrocities
that occurred in Bosnia and Croatia. Del
Ponte has called their continued evasion
of justice a “permanent shadow” on the
work of the Court and the international
community.

International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
Prosecutor v. Emmanuel
Ndindabahizi, Judgment,
ICTR-01-71-A
On January 16, 2007, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Appeals Chamber issued a judgment
upholding the conviction and sentence of
Emmanuel Ndindabahizi. Ndindabahizi,
the Minister of Finance in the Interim
Government of Rwanda, was charged in
connection with the Gitwa Hill massacres,
which took place between April 17–26,
1994, and resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsis. In addition, Ndindabahizi
was alleged to be criminally responsible
for his role in the killings that took place
at various roadblocks in April and May
1994.
On July 15, 2004, the Trial Chamber
convicted Ndindabahizi of the following:
incitement to commit and complicity in
41

genocide for the events at Gitwa Hill;
extermination as a crime against humanity at Gitwa Hill; and instigating and
aiding and abetting both genocide and
murder as a crime against humanity for
the killing of an individual known as
Mr. Nors at the Gaseke roadblock. On
appeal, Ndindabahizi challenged each of
his convictions, as well as his sentence of
life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber
vacated one count of genocide and one
count of crimes against humanity based on
a finding that the Trial Chamber erred in
holding the Appellant responsible for the
death of Mr. Nors, but affirmed the other
convictions and held that the reversal on
the counts relating to Mr. Nors did not
affect the Trial Chamber’s sentence, which
was affirmed.
Among Ndindabahizi’s grounds
for appeal was a challenge to the Trial
Chamber’s finding that the Accused had
visited the roadblock at Gaseke, where Mr.
Nors was killed. Specifically, the Appellant
argued that the Trial Chamber based its
finding solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness which was inconsistent with other evidence and incorrect
as to dates. The Appeals Chamber agreed,
concluding that the lower court’s finding
that the Appellant contributed to the killing of Mr. Nors was “based only on vague
and unverifiable hearsay.” While hearsay
evidence is not per se inadmissible in the
ICTR, the Appeals Chamber noted, “[I]t is
well established that a Trial Chamber must
be cautious in considering such evidence.”
The Appeals Chamber further held that
the Appellant could not be held liable for
instigating and aiding and abetting genocide for the murder of Mr. Nors unless the
Prosecutor established a link between the
Appellant and the deceased. Instigating,
the Appeals Chamber explained, means
“prompting another person to commit an
offence, thus requiring a subsequent criminal action,” while “a conviction for aiding
and abetting presupposes that the support
of the aider and abetter has a substantial
effect upon the perpetrated crime.” Hence,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that,
“[n]o reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded beyond reasonable doubt that
the killing of Mr. Nors was a result attributable to the Appellant’s acts.”
Despite the finding that the Appellant
could not be held liable for instigating
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and aiding and abetting genocide for the
murder of Mr. Nors, the Appeals Chamber
affirmed the convictions for genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity
with respect to Ndindabahizi’s involvement
with the events at Gitwa Hill. Moreover,
the Appeals Chamber found that although
the Appellant could not be found responsible for the death of Mr. Nors, the significance of the crimes for which he had been
convicted involving the events at Gitwa
Hill alone warranted the Trial Chamber’s
sentence of life imprisonment.
After concluding its review of
Ndindabahizi’s challenges to the Trial
Chamber’s judgment, the Appeals Chamber
raised, propio motu, a final potential issue
with respect to that judgment. Specifically,
the Appeals Chamber considered whether
the lower court had convicted the Appellant
for the crime against humanity of extermination on alternative grounds. The issue
arose due to the wording of paragraph 485
of the Trial Judgment, which read, in part:
[T]he Chamber finds that the Accused
himself committed the crime of extermination. He participated in creating,
and contributed to, the conditions for
the mass killing of Tutsi on Gitwa
Hill on 26 April 1994, by distributing
weapons, transporting attackers, and
speaking words of encouragement
that would have reasonably appeared
to give official approval for an attack.
Alternatively, the Chamber finds that
by these words and deeds, the Accused
directly and substantially contributed
to the crime of extermination committed by the attackers at Gitwa Hill,
and is thereby guilty of both instigating, and of aiding and abetting, that
crime.” (Emphasis added)

As the Appeals Chamber recognized,
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence
permit an accused to “be convicted for a
single crime on the basis of several modes
of liability.” However, the Chamber went
on to explain that alternative convictions
for several modes of liability are generally
irreconcilable with the goal of expressing
a judgment in an unambiguous scope as
to the accused’s criminal responsibility.
Specifically, because the mode of liability under which individual responsibility
is found may either increase or decrease
the magnitude of the crime, the criminal
liability of the accused must be unam-

biguously established. Upon reviewing the
Trial Chamber’s holding in paragraph 485
of the judgment, however, the majority
of the Appeals Chamber determined that
the Trial Chamber did not in fact convict Ndindabahizi in the alternative, but
rather intended to fully characterize the
Appellant’s conduct through cumulatively
referring to assorted of modes of liability.
Judge Guney wrote a partial dissent
on this issue, arguing that the majority
did not adequately “assess the characterization by the Trial Chamber of the
Appellant’s criminal conduct,” but rather
simply upheld the Trial Judgment’s finding without a thoughtful consideration of
its accuracy. Moreover, Judge Guney disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s finding,
upheld by the majority of the Appeals
Chamber, that based on the circumstances
of this case, Ndindabahizi’s conduct constituted the “commission” of the act of
extermination. The Trial Chamber found
that extermination “may be committed less
directly than murder, as by participation
in measures intended to bring about the
deaths of a large number of individuals,
but without actually committing a killing
of any person.” According to Judge Guney,
this finding represented a departure from
the appellate jurisprudence of both the
ICTR and the ICTY, which defines the
actus reus of extermination as “the act of
killing on a large scale” or the “systematical subjection of a number of people to
conditions of living that would inevitably
lead to death.” Had the Trial Chamber followed precedent, Judge Guney argued, the
Appellant could not have been convicted
for committing extermination as a crime
against humanity, as the Trial Chamber
found that the evidence did not establish
that the Appellant himself killed any person by his acts at Gitwa Hill.

Prosecutor v. Andre Ntagerura,
Emmauel Bagambiki, and Samuel
Imanishimwe, ICTR-99-46-T
On July 7, 2006, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Appeals Chamber rendered its judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. Andre
Ntagerura, Emmauel Bagambiki, and
Samuel Imanishimwe. The three Accused
had been indicted on charges arising from
large-scale attacks against Tutsi refugees
in the prefecture of Cyangugu, Rwanda
between April and June 1994. On February
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24, 2004, Trial Chamber III acquitted the
Accused Ntagerura and Bagambiki on all
charges. Imanishimwe, who had served
as the acting commander of the Cyangugu
military camp through July 2004, was
also acquitted for the charge of complicity in genocide. However, Imanishimwe
was unanimously found guilty of murder
as a crime against humanity, imprisonment
as a crime against humanity, and torture
as a crime against humanity. In addition,
a majority of the Trial Chamber, Judge
Dolenc dissenting, held that Imanishimwe
was guilty under the theory of superior
responsibility for the crimes of his subordinates committed at the Gashirabwoba football field, which included genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, and
murder and cruel treatment as serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.
Imanishimwe was sentenced to 27 years’
imprisonment. Following delivery of the
Trial Chamber’s judgment, the Prosecutor
and Imanishimwe each filed an appeal.
On appeal, the Prosecution challenged
the Trial Chamber’s refusal to consider
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a basis
upon which to find each of the Accused liable. The Trial Chamber had held that, if the
Prosecutor intended to rely on JCE theory
to hold the accused criminally responsible
as principal perpetrator of the underlying
crimes, rather than as an accomplice, “the
indictment should plead this in an unambiguous manner and specify upon which
form of [JCE] the Prosecutor will rely.”
Having found that the Prosecutor failed to
do so, the Trial Chamber refused to consider the allegations of criminal responsibility based on a JCE theory of liability.
On appeal, the Prosecutor initially challenged the Trial Chamber’s finding that
the indictments failed to properly allege
JCE as a theory of liability. However,
the Prosecutor subsequently acknowledged
that the indictments did not plead JCE with
sufficient specificity, and instead argued
that the indictments had been cured of this
defect and thus the Accused were “provided with clear and coherent information
of the Prosecution’s intention to invoke
joint criminal enterprise as a theory of liability.” Examining this claim, the Appeals
Chamber first rejected the Prosecution’s
claim that its Pre-Trial Brief contained
sufficient factual allegations to put the
Accused on notice of an intent to rely on
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a JCE theory of liability, given that the
Brief made “no specific mention of a joint
criminal enterprise, a common criminal
plan or any other synonym of that mode of
criminal liability.” The Appeals Chamber
did agree that the Prosecution alluded to
JCE in its Opening Statement at trial, but
it concluded that if the material facts of an
accused’s alleged criminal activity are not
disclosed to the Defense until the trial itself,
it will be difficult for the Defense to conduct
a meaningful investigation prior to the commencement of the trial. Moreover, according to the Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor
did not, at any time, specify upon which
form of JCE it was relying. Accordingly,
the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial
Chamber’s finding on JCE liability.
Imanishimwe’s primary ground of
appeal was that the Trial Chamber wrongly
convicted him of superior responsibility
for three crimes — genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, and
murder and cruel treatment as serious
violations of the Geneva Conventions —
in relation to the events which took place
at the football stadium in Gashirabwoba.
Specifically, Imanishimwe challenged the
fact that the Trial Chamber permitted the
Prosecutor to present evidence in support
of the Accused’s superior responsibility
for the crimes, despite having found that
the Prosecutor did not properly plead such
a mode of liability prior to trial. According
to Imanishimwe, the conviction was invalid
because he was unable to prepare a defense
against a charge alleging responsibility as a
superior for the Gashirabwoba massacre.
The Trial Chamber had admitted the
Prosecution’s evidence on Imanishimwe’s
superior responsibility for the crimes
committed at Gashirabwoba by citing the
“Strong Evidence Passage” from the ICTY
Appeals Chamber judgment in the case
of Kupreškić et al. In that judgment, the
Appeals Chamber wrote that it “might
understandably be reluctant to allow a
defect in the form of the indictment to
determine finally the outcome of a case
in which there is strong evidence pointing
towards the guilt of the accused.” The Trial
Chamber in the Ntagerura case interpreted
this language to mean that it could consider
evidence from the Prosecutor on events that
had not been adequately pled in the indictments. Notably, the Trial Chamber admitted evidence regarding Imanishimwe’s
superior responsibility, and ultimately con-

victed the Accused for the criminal acts of
his subordinates at Gashirabwoba, despite
finding that the relevant paragraphs of the
indictment were “unacceptably vague.”
In reviewing Imanishimwe’s appeal,
the Appeals Chamber found that the
lower court had improperly interpreted
the Strong Evidence Passage from the
Kupreškić judgment. The relevant language, according to the Appeals Chamber,
was intended to apply on appeal only, and
specifically where an accused had challenged his or her conviction on the grounds
that the charge on which the accused was
convicted had been insufficiently pled. In
that case, the Strong Evidence Passage
could be used by the Appeals Chamber
in determining whether to remedy a finding of improper pleading by remanding
the case to the Trial Chamber, rather than
by automatically reversing the conviction.
The Kupreški´ decision could not, on the
other hand, be used by a Trial Chamber
to admit evidence on a defective charge.
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber explained,
a conviction may never be pronounced
where the accused’s right to a fair trial
has been violated because of a failure to
provide him with sufficient notice of the
legal and factual grounds underpinning the
charges against him.
The Appeals Chamber therefore agreed
with Imanishimwe that the Trial Chamber
improperly convicted him of responsibility
as a superior for the crimes committed at
the Gashirabwoba stadium. Because the
Trial Chamber had found that the evidence
failed to establish Imanishimwe ordered
the attack at Gashirabwoba or that he was
present, the Appeals Chamber set aside
the guilty verdict for the relevant counts.
As a result, Imanishimwe’s sentence was
reduced from 27 to 12 years in prison.

Prosecutor v. Vincent
Rutaganira, Case No.
ICTR-95-1C-T
The Trial Chamber for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
issued its judgment in the case of Prosecutor
v. Vincent Rutaganira on March 14, 2005,
convicting him of extermination as a crime
against humanity. The Accused was sentenced to six years in prison. Originally,
Rutaganira was charged with several
crimes, including conspiracy to commit
genocide, genocide, murder as a crime
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against humanity, extermination as a crime
against humanity, other inhumane acts as
crimes against humanity, serious violations
of Geneva Convention Common Article
Three, and serious violations of Additional
Protocol II. However, Rutaganira agreed
to plead guilty by omission to the crime
against humanity of extermination and in
return the Prosecutor dismissed all other
charges.
From May 1985 through the end of
July 1994, Rutaganira was conseiller communal of the Mubuga secteur in Rwanda,
responsible for economic, social, and cultural development in the secteur. By virtue
of his office, Rutaganira served as a link
between the inhabitants of his secteur and
the local political structures.
Rutaganira was accused of having played
a leading role in the systematic extermination
of Tutsis in the Catholic Church of Mubuga
in April 1994. Specifically, the indictment
against Rutaganira alleged that approximately one week after thousands of Tutsis
had taken refuge in the Mubuga church, on
or about April 14, 1994, the Accused gave
orders to national and local policemen, as
well as the Interahamwe (extremist Hutu
Militia) and armed civilians, to launch an
attack on the church. The indictment also
alleged that Rutaganira himself took part
personally in the attacks, which went on for
several days. The massacres at the Mubuga
church resulted in around 5,000 deaths and
huge numbers of wounded.
While the Accused initially pled not
guilty to all charges against him, he admitted in a plea agreement concluded with the
Prosecutor to having known that between
April 8–15, 1994, thousands of Tutsi civilians had taken refuge in the Mubuga
church. Moreover, Rutaganira admitted
knowing that the church was attacked
between April 14–17, 1994, by virtue of
the fact that he had observed the attackers
assembling around the church. Finally,
Rutaganira admitted that, despite his position and his having knowledge of the
attacks, he failed to act to protect the Tutsi,
either before or after the massacres.
The ICTR Statute does not directly
address guilty pleas. However, Rule 62(A)
of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provides that, upon an accused’s
first appearance before the court, the Trial
Chamber shall call upon the accused to

Drake et al.: Updates from the International Criminal Courts
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty on each
count. In the case of a plea of guilty, Rule
62(B) requires that the Trial Chamber
confirm that the plea: (i) is made freely
and voluntarily; (ii) is an informed plea;
(iii) is unequivocal; and (iv) is based on
sufficient facts for the crime and accused’s
participation in it, either on the basis of
objective indicia or of lack of any material
disagreement between the parties about
the facts of the case. Rule 62bis provides
that the Prosecutor and Defense may agree
that, upon the accused entering a plea of
guilty, the Prosecutor will do one or more
of the following: (i) apply to amend the
indictment accordingly; (ii) submit that
a specific sentence or sentencing range
is appropriate; (iii) not oppose a request
by the accused for a particular sentence
or sentencing range. The Trial Chamber,
however, is not bound by any agreement
between the Prosecutor and Defense.
On December 8, 2005, the Trial Chamber
found the guilty plea of Rutaganira to have
been done freely and voluntarily, and to
have been an informed, unequivocal and
sincere plea. The Chamber therefore proceeded to examine whether all the elements of the crime against humanity of
extermination were present, and whether
the form of the Accused’s participation in
the perpetration of the crime was supported
by the facts.
Article 3(b) of the ICTR Statute gives
the Trial Chamber the power to prosecute
someone for extermination as a crime
against humanity when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population that was targeted on
national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds. In addition, the Chamber
looked to prior case law and found that,
to be guilty of extermination, the Accused
must have been involved in killings of
civilians on a large scale. The Chamber
found that the massacres committed at the
Mubuga church had been perpetrated on
a large scale and had caused thousands
of causalities. The Chamber also found
that the massacres had been perpetrated
as part of a widespread and systematic
attack. Finally, the Chamber found that
the thousands of people mentioned were
victims because they were members of the
Tutsi ethnic group. Therefore, the Chamber
found that the massacres committed at the
Mubuga church amounted to extermination

as a crime against humanity under Article
3(b) of the Statute.
Having determined that the Mubuga
church massacres satisfied the requirements of the crime against humanity of
extermination, the Trial Chamber next
turned to the issue of whether one can be
convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of the crime through omission,
which is the sole mode of responsibility to
which Rutaganira pled guilty. Complicity
is not expressly included among the forms
of liability enumerated in Article 6(1) of
the ICTR Statute, which provides that a
person shall be individually responsible for
a crime if he “planned, instigated, ordered,
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation, or execution
of the crime.” However, both ad hoc tribunals have held that aiding and abetting
is a form of complicity, which consists
of “practical assistance, encouragement,
or moral support which has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime.”
Furthermore, the ad hoc tribunals have
held that aiding and abetting as provided
for in Article 6(1) may be carried out by
omission, rather than exclusively by commission. Accordingly, the Chamber held
that participation by omission in extermination as a crime against humanity is covered by the aiding and abetting provision
of Article 6(1) of the Statute.
Finally, the Trial Chamber considered
whether Rutaganira himself was guilty of
the crime against humanity of extermination by omission, considering the elements
of aiding and abetting by omission. In
determining the actus reus, the Chamber
discussed whether the Accused had the
authority to prevent the crime, and whether
he had a legal duty to act which he failed
to fulfill. The Chamber determined that, by
virtue of his role as conseiller communal,
Rutaganira had some power to protect
the Tutsis who sought refuge at Mubuga
church. Indeed, several witnesses who testified for the Defense to offer mitigating
circumstances for purposes of sentencing
revealed that, prior to the events of April
1994, Rutaganira had readily opposed any
decisions by the bourgmestre, or mayor,
which struck him as unfair or inappropriate
for the people in his secteur. Therefore, the
Chamber found that Rutaganira “had the
power to convene a meeting of the inhabitants of his secteur and conduct discussions
about the tragic events in order to prevent
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participation in the massacres that occurred
at the church, at least by civilians.” The
Chamber further found that Rutaganira had
a legal duty to use his authority to lessen
the harm of the crime, as international law
places a duty on every public authority to
act in order to protect human life. Because
Rutaganira failed to use his authority to
prevent the violation of basic human rights,
the Chamber held that the facts admitted by the Accused proved that the actus
reus requirements of aiding an abetting by
omission were satisfied.
To determine whether there was sufficient mens rea, the Chamber considered
whether Rutaganira had knowledge of the
principal perpetrator committing extermination as part of a widespread and systematic attack, and whether he knew that his
conduct would further the perpetration of
that crime. The Chamber found that by virtue of his position as conseiller communal
for Muguba secteur, “the Accused must
have known about the serious events that
were occurring in his sectuer and the crimes
that were being perpetrated there on a large
scale.” As a result, the Chamber found
that Rutaganira knew that his omissions
were part of a widespread and systematic
attack targeted at a civilian population on
ethnic grounds. Furthermore, Rutaganira
was not only aware of his duties as conseiller communal but also “of his moral
authority vis a vis the civilian population
in his secteur.” He admitted that although
he was conseiller he did not act to protect
the Tutsis taking refuge in the church thus
satisfying the mens rea requirement of the
crime. Therefore, the Chamber found that
there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Rutaganira was guilty of extermination as
a crime against humanity because he aided
and abetted that crime by omission.

Special Court for Sierra Leone
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara &
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T
On June 20, 2007, the Trial Chamber
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
(SCSL) delivered its judgment in the case
of Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu,
marking the first judgment issued by the
Special Court.
The three Accused were senior members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), a faction rebel group
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that broke away from the Sierra Leone
Army and forcibly overthrew the democratically elected government of President
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in May 1997. Each
was convicted of either committing or
bearing superior responsibility for: the
war crimes of acts of terrorism, collective punishments, outrages upon personal
dignity, pillage, violence to life, health and
physical or mental well-being of persons,
in particular murder, and violence to life,
health and physical or mental well-being of
persons, as mutilation; the crimes against
humanity of rape, extermination, murder,
and enslavement; and the recruitment and
use of child solders as a serious violation
of international humanitarian law. The sentences are as follows: 50 years’ imprisonment for Brima, 45 years for Kamara, and
50 years for Kanu.
Among the theories of criminal liability forwarded by the Prosecution was an
allegation that the three Accused had participated in a joint criminal enterprise that
involved “gaining and exercising control
over the population of Sierra Leone in
order to prevent or minimize resistance
to their geographic control.” The crimes
alleged in the indictment, according to the
Prosecutor, “were either actions within
the joint criminal enterprise or were a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
[JCE].” The Defense challenged these allegations on the ground that the Prosecution
failed to properly plead JCE liability, arguing that the common purpose to “take any
actions to gain and exercise political power
and control over the territory of Sierra
Leone,” as such, did not amount to a specific crime and thus was too broad to prove
the existence of a JCE.
The Trial Chamber began its analysis by
explaining the three forms of JCE: basic,
systemic, and extended. Each of the three
forms requires: (1) a plurality of individuals; (2) the existence of a common plan to
commit a crime within the jurisdiction of
the court; and (3) some level of contribution by the accused to the common plan.
The differences among the three “forms”
of JCE are found in the requisite mens rea.
In the “basic” form, all co-perpetrators
must share the “same criminal intention.”
The “systemic” form is characterized by
the existence of an organized system of illtreatment, such as a concentration camp,
of which the accused must have personal
knowledge as well as an intent to further

the system of ill-treatment. Finally, under the
“extended” form of JCE, an accused may be
held responsible for crimes falling outside
the scope of a common plan if the crimes
were foreseeable and the accused willingly
assumed the risk that such crimes would be
committed by a member of the group.
Turning to the specifics of the Defense’s
challenge, the Trial Chamber agreed that
the Prosecution had not properly pled
liability for JCE against the former members of the AFRC. First, the Trial Chamber
found that, by alleging the “basic” and the
“extended” forms of JCE disjunctively, the
Prosecutor impeded the Defense’s ability to
know the material facts of the JCE against
them. The Trial Chamber then explained
that the Prosecution did not sufficiently
plead either the “basic” form of JCE or
the “extended” form. Considering the latter form first, the Trial Chamber held that
while “serious violations of international
humanitarian law by certain members of
armed forces during conflict are a foreseeable consequence of such engagement in
conflict,” this does not “necessarily make
the act of engagement in armed conflict
in itself an international crime.” Thus, the
Trial Chamber rejected what it described
as the Prosecutor’s attempt to charge the
foreseeability of international crimes in
a common purpose that is “not inherently criminal.” Similarly, the Chamber
held that the Prosecution had not properly
pleaded the “basic” form of JCE because
the common plan described in the indictment — namely, to gain and exercise
political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone — did not involve
international crimes at the inception of the
JCE. Finally, although the Trial Chamber
recognized that a common purpose might
change over time such that “a new JCE
may emerge from a common purpose
fundamentally different in nature and in
scope from the initial common purpose,”
the Chamber found that the Prosecution
failed to “provide material facts of this
new or changed common purpose in the
[i]ndictment.”
In its indictment, the Prosecution
charged each of the Accused on four different counts of sexual violence: rape,
sexual slavery, and other inhumane acts
in the form of “forced marriage” as crimes
against humanity, as well as outrages upon
personal dignity as a war crime. Based on
the evidence presented, the Trial Chamber
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convicted each Accused on one count of
rape as a crime against humanity and one
count of outrages upon personal dignity
as a war crime, which the Chamber held
“encompasses rape and/or other types of
sexual violence as well as enslavement.”
However, the Trial Chamber dismissed
the charges of sexual slavery and other
inhumane acts (forced marriage) as crimes
against humanity on the ground that these
charges were duplicative of the charges
for the crime against humanity of rape and
the war crime of outrages upon personal
dignity.
Justice Doherty dissented on the majority’s dismissal of the charges relating to
sexual slavery and other inhumane acts
(forced marriage) as crimes against humanity. As to the first, Justice Doherty objected
to the majority’s finding on the ground
that the Defense had not challenged the
duplicative nature of the charge until after
the trial had concluded. With respect to the
second dismissed charge, Justice Doherty
wrote that the majority failed “to determine
whether ‘forced marriage’ is of sufficient
gravity to meet the requirements of an
‘other inhumane act’” constituting a crime
against humanity under the SCSL Statute.
She stressed that the conduct contemplated
as “forced marriage” does not “necessarily
involve elements of physical violence such
as abduction, enslavement or rape,” and
thus was not duplicative of the charges for
the crime against humanity of rape or the
war crime of outrages upon personal dignity. Furthermore, Justice Doherty argued
that, by “vitiating the will of one party
and forcing him or her to enter into a
remain in a marital union, the victim is
subject to physical and mental suffering”
sufficiently grave to constitute the crime
against humanity of other inhumane acts.
The Trial Chamber judgment against
the AFRC constitutes the first time an
internationalized tribunal has found individual criminal responsibility for the act of
recruiting and using child soldiers in armed
conflict. The issue was first addressed
by the SCSL Appeals Chamber in March
2004 in response to a defense motion arguing that the recruitment and use of child
soldiers was not a war crime in the context
of a non-international armed conflict at
the time the accused allegedly engaged in
the practice in Sierra Leone. The Appeals
Chamber rejected the claim, holding that
the crime had been recognized under cus-
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tomary international law by November
1996, the beginning of the SCSL’s temporal jurisdiction.
In the case against the AFRC, the Trial
Chamber found that the three accused routinely conscripted, enlisted, or used children
under the age of 15 for military purposes.
Thousands of these children were abducted
throughout Sierra Leone, placed in AFRC
training camps, and ultimately used in combat. Notably, the Trial Chamber found that
the “use” of child soldiers to “participate
actively in the hostilities” is not limited
to “participation in combat.” Rather, any
labor or support “that gives effect to, or
helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active participation, including the
use of children to conduct logistical support, carry supplies, acquire food, procure
equipment, carry messages, create trails,
or act as decoys or human shields.” This
finding is notable in light of the ongoing
debates within the International Committee
for the Red Cross and broader International
Humanitarian Law community regarding
the range of activities that may constitute
“participation” in armed conflict.

International Criminal Court
The Situation in Uganda and the
cases against Commanders of
the Lord’s Resistance Army
On August 10, 2007, the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber
(PTC) II issued the Decision on Victims’
Application for Participation, granting six
applicants victim status in the Case against
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commanders and two applicants victim status
in the Uganda Situation. Forty-two applications were deferred until the Victims
Participation and Reparations Section
reports additional information. The Court
will also appoint a common legal representative.
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and
Office for Public Counsel for the Defense
(OCPD) continue to argue that the criteria for gaining victim status be applied
restrictively. The prosecution emphasized
that allowing participation of any person
who claims to have suffered as a result
of a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction
would have three consequences of concern.
First, broad inclusion would negatively
impact the activities and limited resources
of the Court. Second, the resources of the

Victims and Witnesses Unit would be
depleted by extending its protective efforts
to an increased number of victims. Finally,
broad inclusion could threaten the integrity
of the trial and diminish perceptions that
investigations are objective, particularly
by labeling people “victims” at the pre-trial
stage before actual crimes are established.
In determining the applicants’ status as
victims, PTC II took a fact-based approach
based on previous PTC I jurisprudence in
the DRC Situation. Under Article 68(3) of
the Rome Statute, the principle criterion is
that the “personal interests” of applicant
victims must be affected. Rule 85(a) of
the Rules provides that, “‘victim’ means
natural persons who have suffered harm
as a result of the commission of any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The
assessment of an applicant’s claim must
analyze i) whether the identity of the applicant as a natural person appears duly established; ii) whether the events described
constitute a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction; iii) whether the applicant claims to
have suffered harm; and iv) most crucially,
whether such harm appears to have arisen
as a result of the event constituting a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
In a Situation, the applicant’s statements must show to a high degree of probability temporally and territorially that the
alleged incidents occurred. The determination must also consider the impact on the
applicant’s personal interests.
Peace talks in June concluded with a
draft protocol on accountability and reconciliation that would establish national,
hybrid war crimes tribunals that try suspected war criminals under traditional
tribal justice systems. According to interior minister Ruhakana Rugunda, the protocol envisages “a unique legal system
designed to achieve lasting peace and
accountability.” There is some doubt, however, whether a national alternative to the
ICC would provide sufficiently vigorous
investigations and prosecutions.
Achieving justice requires credible
and independent prosecutions that meet
international fair trial standards and are
accompanied by sentences that reflect the
gravity of the crimes. Under the principle
of complementarity, if national prosecutions are legitimate, the ICC does not have
jurisdiction. According to Human Rights
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Watch, however, sham national proceedings aimed at shielding the accused, or
legitimate prosecutions accompanied by
“slap-on-the-wrist” sentences will not suffice to convince ICC judges that ICC prosecution would be duplicative. Regardless,
the government of Uganda remains obligated to arrest and surrender LRA leaders
to the ICC.
Ensuring justice is achieved — as
opposed to focusing solely on reconciliation and forgiveness — is important
because trials provide accountability, promote stability, and deter future atrocities.
Framing the issue as a peace-versus-justice
debate can present a false sense of conflict
that obstructs the achievement of both.
Impunity does not lead to lasting peace;
those interested in seeing the conflict end
should insist on an outcome that includes
both peace and justice. An International
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) report
concluded that the majority of respondents
(citizens in eight counties most affected by
the conflict) do not want the ICC to jeopardize the peace process but do want some
form of accountability for past crimes.
This perceived conflict between peace
and justice is belied by facts on the ground.
Many groups have recognized that the ICC
warrants played an important role in bringing LRA leaders to the negotiating table.
Similarly, despite ongoing peace talks, on
September 8, 2007, Ugandan President
Yoweri Museveni and DRC President
Joseph Kabila signed an agreement to
send joint military forces to dislodge LRA
fighters from their stronghold in Garamba
National Park, a jungle in northeast DRC.
While this was a reaction to LRA failures
to comply with peace-treaty benchmarks,
the LRA has threatened retaliation and
criticized the government for instigating
additional violence. While this agreement
may be mere government posturing, it indicates that ICC warrants are less an obstruction to peace-building than the inability of
parties to set and achieve peace-building
goals. Characterizing the ICC warrants
as obstructions to peace therefore appears
to be more of a ploy by leaders trying to
escape criminal liability than a serious
obstruction to cooperation.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8

The Situation in the Democratic
republic of the Congo and the
cases against Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo and Germain Katanga
General Germain Katanga was transferred to The Hague in the early morning
hours of October 18, 2007, becoming
the second suspect admitted to ICC custody. Katanga is charged on the basis
of individual criminal responsibility for
war crimes and crimes against humanity,
including killings, pillaging, child recruitment, and sexual enslavement. Katanga
was chief of staff of the Patriotic Force
of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), the military
wing of the Front for National Integration
(FNI) militia. Ethnically Lendu, the militia
fought against the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC), an ethnically Hema group
formerly led by Thomas Lubanga, the first
suspect transferred to the ICC. Although
Congolese authorities arrested Katanga in
2005, he was never tried, and his continued
detention violated international fair trial
norms.
Katanga’s transfer helped the Court
salvage credibility lost within the DRC
due to the slow proceedings and the limited
scope of charges brought against Lubanga.
Sources in Ituri, however, said that the
transfer was announced in Bunia (the
capital of Ituri province) on the government’s deadline for disarming Ituri militia,
and served, at least partially, to foil the
disarmament process. UPC officials said
the ICC prosecution should not limit its
attention to the Hema-Lendu conflict, but
should broaden investigations to include
other ethnicities, as well as state officials
in Kinshasa and Kampala who funded and
supported the local warlords.
In February, Defense Counsel Jean
Flamme filed a confidential request to be
removed from the case, claiming the Court
provided fewer resources to the Defense
than to the Prosecution. Lubanga selected
Catherine Mabille as Flamme’s replacement. The Court officially confirmed
Mabille’s appointment on June 22, leaving
a period in which Lubanga was unrepresented and proceedings were stayed.
In May, Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I)
rejected Lubanga’s request for additional
resources. The Paris Bar requested leave
to intervene as amicus curiae to present
a memo on the economic, material and

human resources reasonably necessary for
an effective defense.
The Executive Committee of the
International Criminal Bar (ICB) made
a similar filing in June, requesting leave
to file an amicus curaie brief supporting Lubanga’s May 25 pro se request for
review of the Registrar’s decision denying
him supplemental legal aid. On June 14,
the Registrar granted the defense limited additional resources including one
additional legal assistant. Moreover, the
Registrar ordered co-counsel to immediately join the defense team, allowed former
counsel to participate as a consultant for
three months, and provided an investigation budget of €55,315.
While ICC officials study feasibility
issues, military courts in the DRC may
offer hope for more immediate justice on
the ground. In February, a military court in
Bunia handed down death sentences to 13
soldiers for massacring civilians in Ituri;
in April 2006, a court found seven officers
guilty of mass rape. Significantly, this
marks the first time rape has been tried as
a crime against humanity in the DRC. The
military courts are highly controversial,
however, and many critics cite problems
such as trumped-up charges, civilian trials, rampant political interference, and
failure to conform to international fair trial
standards. To improve the system, a military criminal law advisor with the United
Nations Mission in Democratic Republic
of Congo (MONUC) is identifying and
presenting resource needs to international
donors. Basic resource challenges are dire,
but MONUC officials say given proper
support and guidance, the military justice
sector is one of the greatest hopes for dealing with impunity in the country.

The Situation in Darfur and the
cases against Ahmad Haroun and
Ali Kosheib
One of the greatest challenges facing
the ICC is obtaining cooperation to promote peace and justice in Sudan, where
the international community has done little to address grave, widely documented
human rights violations that continue to
plague Darfur. As a result, the Sudanese
government has flaunted its disregard for
the international community, the laws of
humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.
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During Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon’s visit to Sudan in September, the
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Ahmad
Haroun — who the ICC has charged
with 42 counts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, including murder, rape
and persecution related to Darfur — was
appointed to co-chair the committee that
handles human rights complaints from
Darfur. The other ICC accused, Janjaweed
leader Ali Kosheib, had been held in
state prison on charges being brought
in national proceedings. Although U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1594 requires
the Sudanese government to comply with
ICC arrest warrants, the Government of
Sudan released Kosheib from prison on
lack of evidence. The ICC charged Kosheib
with 51 counts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, including rape, torture,
and murder. The government stated multiple times that it will not comply with ICC
investigations on Darfur.
The Sudanese government created a
Special Criminal Court on the Events in
Darfur in June 2005. The court would
serve as “a substitute to the International
Criminal Court,” according to Sudan’s
Chief Justice. In its first year, the Court
only heard thirteen cases involving lowranking individuals primarily accused of
minor offenses which did not reflect the
gravity or scale of atrocities in Darfur. In
its second year, the Court reviewed no new
cases. Derived from a mix of Sharia law,
Sudanese statutes and international law,
the Court’s statute provides no definition
of crimes against humanity, nor does it
contain a prohibition on evidence obtained
through torture. The statute contains broad
immunity clauses and requires a severely
high threshold of proof in the prosecution
of rape, including testimony from four
male witnesses. This presents a serious
obstacle to promoting justice and accountability in a conflict where combatants have
widely employed rape as a tactic aimed at
the psychological and emotional subjugation of a civilian population.
In proceedings for the Situation in
Sudan, PTC I entertained hearings relating to the standard for victim participation
similar to those taking place in the Uganda
Situation.
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Hybrid and Internationalized
Tribunals
The Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the hybrid
Cambodian-United Nations tribunal established to try senior leaders of the Khmer
Rouge has made positive strides over the
past several months. Corruption allegations
and low standards for hiring Cambodian
staff, however, have raised concerns
regarding the court’s transparency.
The ECCC seeks justice for victims of
a genocidal regime accused of killing 1.7
million Cambodians. Pursuant to a 2001
Cambodian statute establishing the court,
the ECCC has jurisdiction over senior
Khmer Rouge officials responsible for
serious violations of Cambodian and international law perpetrated between April 17,
1975, and January 6, 1979. To date, no
senior Khmer Rouge officials have faced
prosecution before a properly constituted
court for international crimes committed
during this period. A June 2003 agreement
between Cambodia and the UN specifies
the degree of international involvement
with the court. The ECCC is a hybrid court
with Cambodian and international judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
On 13 June 2007, a panel of judges
agreed on the Internal Rules governing
ECCC’s procedure after stalling for over
six months due to disagreements. Judges
claim that the Internal Rules lead to “fair,
transparent trials before an independent
and impartial court.” The Internal Rules
deal with a wide spectrum of issues and
allow victims to join lawsuits as civil parties to obtain collective and non-financial
reparations, but not individual financial
compensation. Prosecutors must prove
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict an accused. Moreover,
the Internal Rules guarantee defendants
will have one Cambodian and one foreign
attorney.
Certain key Khmer Rouge officials
will never stand trial, including Pol Pot,
the regime’s notorious leader who died
in 1998 and Ta Mok, the ruthless military commander who died in July 2006.
Nevertheless, on July 18, 2007, ECCC
prosecutors announced they submitted a
list of five individuals to the tribunal to be

considered for prosecution. Since then, the
tribunal has taken custody of two key figures, including Kaing Guek Eav, known as
“Duch” and Nuon Chea, “Brother Number
Two.” Duch commanded the notorious
S-21 prison at Tuol Sleng, where regime
officials tortured and killed thousands of
Cambodians. He had been detained since
1999 for charges the Cambodian government brought against him but was transferred to ECCC’s custody in late July.
Duch, aged 65, is the youngest living
leader of the regime. Nuon Chea, known
as “Brother Number Two” due to his service as Pol Pot’s second in command was
arrested on September 19 and charged with
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Despite progress, court observers
have criticized the ECCC for corruption.
Allegations that Cambodian employees
paid court officials to obtain and maintain employment emerged last year. In
response, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) contracted an independent third party to audit the court’s
hiring practices. The audit, which did not
investigate monetary kickback allegations,
ran between January 29 to February 8, and
March 27–30, 2007.

and will make a substantive difference in
problematic hiring practices.

The War Crimes Chamber of
the State Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
With the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
nearing the end of its mandate, the War
Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the State Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to
grow in importance. When the conflict
ceased, the country’s legal institutions
were impaired and incapable of impartially
trying those accused of atrocities during the war. It became apparent that the
ICTY could only try a select number of
suspects and needed help from domestic
jurisdictions within the former Yugoslavia.
In February 2002, the Office of the High
Representative, responsible for implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords,
and the ICTY agreed to transfer lower and
mid-level suspects to domestic jurisdictions. The WCC emerged through these
circumstances in early 2005.

Chapman University School of Law
professor John Hall wrote in a September
21 article for the Wall Street Journal Online
that the audit’s findings illustrate severe
problems with the tribunal’s hiring practices. The audit claimed that the hiring process was in such a poor state that, “recruits
did not meet the minimum requirements
specified in the vacancy announcements
in terms of academic qualifications or professional working experience.” The audit
recommended that Cambodian staff be
dismissed, and a new recruitment process
begin under UNDP supervision. The audit
suggested that the UNDP should consider
withdrawing from the project altogether if
Cambodian administrators failed to make
fundamental changes to hiring practices.

The WCC is one of three chambers within the State Court of BosniaHerzegovina’s Criminal Division. Sitting
in Sarajevo, the WCC’s jurisdiction is limited to trying accused war criminals who
perpetrated crimes in Bosnia. The WCC
may hear both cases of ICTY transfers
and sensitive cases initiated within local
or national courts. Three-judge panels consisting of two international judges and a
local judge preside over trial and appellate
chambers. The court’s international components incorporate standards accepted in
the international community. International
judges are a temporary characteristic of the
court, however, and the court will phase
out these judges by 2010. Fully integrated
into the Bosnian legal system, the WCC
will continue to function indefinitely as
its jurisdiction is not limited to a specific
time period.

In response to the audit, the Project
Board, which oversees the “Special Support
of the Cambodian Side of the Budget for
the ECCC,” took measures to improve the
tribunal’s human resources management.
In its September meeting, the board agreed
upon measures to improve recruitment
procedures of the Cambodian staff and
to promote transparency. It remains to be
seen if such measures will be implemented

Since its inception, the WCC has convicted twelve accused war criminals. The
most common charges the court has brought
against the accused are war crimes against
civilians and crimes against humanity.
According to the State Court’s web site,
the court convicted one person at the trial
level in 2005. In 2006, however, the WCC
convicted eight individuals. Among the
convicted was Radovan Stanković, the first
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war criminal transferred from the ICTY
to the WCC. The appellate chamber confirmed a lower court conviction, and convicted two individuals the appellate division had earlier remanded for new trials.
To date, the WCC continues to function successfully. Recent convictions at the
trial level include three accused war criminals: Krešo Lučić, a former commander
of the Croatian Defence Council military
police convicted of crimes against humanity; Nenad Tanasković, a Bosnian Serb
former reserve police officer convicted
of crimes against humanity; and Niset
Ramić, a Bosnian Mulsim convicted of
war crimes committed against Serbs. In a
rare moment, the WCC acquitted Momčilo
Mandić, a Bosnian Serb and ex-interior
minister, serving later as justice minister,
who was accused of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
Along with its successes, the court has
dealt with problematic issues. Despite the
fact that distinct criminal codes operate
in different courts throughout Bosnia, the
WCC has had to apply the new set of laws
that Parliament passed in 2005. These
include a new criminal code and a new

criminal procedure code. The laws are
based on both Bosnian law and modern
European law, incorporate elements of
common law, and include changes to the
investigative, trial and appellate stages.
In September 2007, a group of defendants
in the WCC’s custody began a hunger
strike to protest the criminal code the court
applies. The accused want the court to
apply the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia’s (SFRY) Criminal Code,
which envisages less severe punishments
than the new code and does not include
crimes against humanity. The discrepancies in the different criminal codes pose
problems that the Court must effectively
resolve.
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The five 14- and 15-year-old boys who
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in the local police station, where visiting
family members found Tseten bleeding
from the head. Government officials did
not allow family members to take Tsetsen
for medical care.
On September 10, non-uniformed security officers moved the students to the town
of Xiahe, two hours away. Xiahe officials
deny family visitation, and refuse to reveal
the location of the students. Tseten is currently being treated in a hospital in Xiahe
for severe head injuries. It is unclear if he
will be detained again after his treatment.
Two 14-year-old boys, who were moved
to Xiahe, were released on September 24
under the conditions that each of their
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U.S.) and that the boys be confined to their
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